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ARTICLE 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN MARYLAND: RECONCILING 
FEDERAL LAW, STATE LAW, AND THE PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 
By: Professor Stephen J. Shapiro * 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The ability of juries to award punitive damages in addition to 
compensatory damages dates back to British common law, and is a 
firmly entrenched part of the jurisprudence of most states.' Juries 
have had the power to award punitive damages both to punish the 
defendant for particularly heinous or reprehensible conduct and to 
deter the defendant and others from similar conduct. The wide 
discretion given to juries to punish defendants by awarding punitive 
damages to individual plaintiffs has always been controversia1.2 In the 
1980' s, an increase in the number and size of such awards resulted in 
an intensification of this debate. Although some empirical studies 
showed that punitive damage awards were infrequent and modest,3 
there was a perception among many, including some United States 
Supreme Court Justices and some members of the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, that such awards were "skyrocketing,,4 in both number and 
amount.s It is clear, however, that in at least some cases, juries gave 
4 
Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A. Haverford College, 
1971; J.D. University of Pennsylvania, 1976. 
In Pac. Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. I, 14 (1991) the United States Supreme Court 
noted that, "punitive damages have long been a part of traditional state tort law." 
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255 (1984). Blackstone appears to have 
noted their use. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 137-38. See also Wilkes v. Wood, 
Lofft 1,98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763). 
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 8 n.4 (for arguments dating back to 1872 for and against the propriety 
of allowing juries to award puniti ve damages). 
See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and 
Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 159 (2002) ("Archival research 
examining overall patterns of awards find that punitive damages are infrequently 
awarded, moderate in size, awarded in response to outrageous conduct, and often reduced 
post-trial."). 
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
"As noted in the opinion of Judges Eldridge, Cole and Chasanow in Schaefer v. 
Miller ... 322 Md. at 312-332, 587 A.2d at 498-509, in recent years there has been a 
proliferation of claims for punitive damages in tort cases, and awards of punitive 
27 
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astronomical awards of millions, hundreds of millions and in one 
infamous case, twenty-eight billion dollars in damages.6 Although 
trial judges and appellate courts in most jurisdictions have the power 
and duty to reduce excessive awards and regularly do so, some courts 
did approve some very large awards, sometimes many times larger 
than the amount of the plaintiff s compensatory damages. 7 
Starting in the early 1990's, both the United States Supreme Court 
and the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed the issue of jury 
discretion in awarding punitive damages. The two courts addressed 
the perceived problem in two different ways. The United States 
Supreme Court focused their attention mainly on the excessive amount 
of such awards .. It held that the Due Process Clause regulates both the 
procedures used in awarding punitive damages and the amounts of 
such awards. 8 The Court required that juries be given sufficient 
instructions to enable them to make awards based on the purpose of 
punitive damages, and required state trial judges and appellate courts 
to reduce the amount of such awards if they were "grossly excessive.,,9 
The Court provided state judges with guideposts for determining the 
appropriate amount of punitive damage awards and required that the 
amounts be proportionate to the amount of compensatory damages. 10 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland focused its attention instead on 
the proof required for a jury to make a punitive damages award in the 
first place. I I It held that punitive damage awards could only be made 
if the defendant's conduct rose to the level of actual malice (evil 
motive or intent to do harm, or knowing that its actions would be 
harmful) and not just implied malice (~ross negligence, recklessness, 
or should have known of the harm). 2 In addition, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that juries should be instructed that they 
8 
9 
\0 
II 
12 
damages have often been extremely high." Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 
420,450,601 A.2d 633, 647-48 (1992) (internal citations omitted). 
The twenty-eight billion dollar award was reduced on appeal to twenty-eight million 
dollars. See Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 140-41 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2006). 
See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 62 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("As recently as a decade ago, the 
largest award of punitive damages affirmed by an appellate court in a products liability 
case was $250,000 .... Since then, awards more than 30 times as high have been 
sustained on appea1.") (internal citations omitted). 
See infra section II. 
See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,585 (1996); see also infra 
section II. 
See infra section II. 
See infra section III. 
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 460-69, 601 A.2d 633, 653-57 (1992). 
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must find that actual malice had been proved by "clear and convincing 
evidence," and not just a preponderance of the evidence. 13 
For the most part, federal law, state law, and the Maryland Civil 
Pattern Jury Instructions based on those laws, are clear and consistent 
with each other. There are, however, some areas where the pattern 
jury instructions should be changed so that juries can be given more 
guidance in applying Maryland law on the question of whether to 
award punitive damages. In addition, there are several areas where 
both Maryland law and the pattern jury instructions need to be 
changed or clarified to comply with Supreme Court mandates relating 
to the amount of punitive damage awards. 
This article will suggest several changes to Maryland law and the 
Maryland Civil Pattern Jury Instructions, so that the instructions more 
accurately reflect Maryland law, and that Maryland law complies with 
the Due Process Clause. The proposed changes include: 
• providing a clearer standard in the instructions for when. 
punitive damages should be awarded; 14 
• clarifying that the "clear and convincing" standard applies 
only to the finding of "actual malice" and not to the 
broader question of whether and in what amount to award 
punitive damages; 15 
• changing the law, the procedure and the jury instructions 
relating to whether and when a jury may consider 
evidence of the defendant's financial condition in 
calculating the amount of a punitive damage award; 16 and 
• providing more guidance to juries as to the appropriate 
amount of punitive damage awards. 17 
II. DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 
In response to several constitutional challenges to large punitive 
damages awards, the Supreme Court had, on a number of occasions 
expressed "doubts" and/or "concern" about the constitutionality of 
13 Id. at 460-69,601 A.2d at 653-57. 
14 See infra section v. A. 
15 See infra section v. B. 
16 See infra section v. C. 
17 See infra section v. D. 
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excessive awards. 18 Until 1990, however, the Court had rejected all 
constitutional challenges to punitive damages. In 1989, the Court 
held, in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal Inc.,19 
that the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment did not apply 
to a punitive damage award in a civil case between private parties. 
The Court declined to address the question of whether the Due Process 
Clause acts as a check on jury discretion to award punitive damages, 
putting off that inquiry to "another day.,,20 
That day came sooner, rather than later. In Pacific Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Has lip, 21 the defendant challenged a punitive damage 
award greater than $800,000, which was more than four times the 
amount of compensatory damages. The Court in Haslip first reviewed 
the history and purposes of punitive damages awards. The Court 
noted that "the common-law method for assessing punitive damages 
was well established before the Fourteenth Amendment was 
enacted.,,22 It also determined that "every state and federal court that 
has considered the question has ruled that the common-law method for 
assessing punitive damages does not in itself violate due process.,,23 
The Court, therefore, held that the common-law method of assessing 
punitive damages was not "so inherently unfair as to deny due process 
and be per se unconstitutional.,,24 
The Court stated, however, that this was not "the end of the 
matter,,,25 recognizing that the imposition of punitive damages could, 
at least in some cases, be unconstitutional. The Court proceeded to 
review the constitutionality of the punitive damages award in that case 
under the Due Process Clause, and ultimately, it determined that the 
award in question was constitutional.26 
In upholding the award, the Court cited numerous factors. One 
factor was that the jury had been given instructions as to the nature 
18 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. I, 9 (1991) ("This Court and individual 
Justices thereof on a number of occasions in recent years have expressed doubts about 
the constitutionality of certain punitive damages awards. In Browning-Ferris Industries 
of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989), all nine participating Members 
of the Court noted concern."). 
19 492 U.S. 257 (1989). 
20 Id.at 276-77. 
21 499 U.S. I (1991). 
22 !d. at 17. 
23 !d. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 18. 
26 Id. at 23-24. 
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and purpose of punitive damages.27 Another was that the Alabama 
appellate courts examined individual awards to ensure that they did 
"not exceed an amount that will accomplish society's goals of 
punishment and deterrence.,,28 While the Court concentrated on the 
procedures used by the Alabama courts and not the size of the awards, 
it noted that a punitive damages award four times the amount of the 
compensatory damages "may be close to the line" of being 
unconstitutional. 29 
The real revolution in the Court's jurisprudence on the subject 
came several years later in the cases of TXO Production Corp. v. 
Alliance Resources Corp.30 and BMW of North America, Inc. v. 
Gore,31 in which the Court held that the Due Process Clause applied 
not only to the procedures used to award punitive damages, but to the 
amount of the award itself, prohibiting awards that were grossly 
excessive. In BMW v. Gore, the plaintiff, the buyer of a new BMW, 
had obtained a two million dollar award against the car maker for not 
notifying him of pre-delivery repairs to the car, even though his 
compensatory damages had been set at only $4,000.32 The Court 
established three "guideposts" for determining the constitutionality of 
an award: (1) the reprehensibility of defendant's conduct; (2) the 
relationship between the harm or potential harm suffered by the 
plaintiff and the punitive damage award; and (3) the difference 
between the punitive damages award and the "civil penalties 
authorized or imposed in comparable cases. ,,33 The Court refused to 
establish a "simple mathematical formula,,34 or "bright line,,35 test for 
determining the constitutionality of any specific award, but held that 
given the facts of that specific case and the extent of BMW's 
culpability, the award in that case, which was 500 times larger than the 
actual damages, was "grossly excessive.,,36 
The Court came much closer to establishing that "bright line" in 
2002 when it decided State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
27 Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19 (1991). 
28 Id. at 20-22 (quoting Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 222 (Ala. 1989); Wilson 
v. Dukona Corp., 547 So. 2d 70, 73 (Ala. 1989)). 
29 Id. at 23. 
30 509 U.S. 443 (1993). 
31 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 574-75. 
34 Id. at 582. 
35 Id. at 582 (quoting Pac. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18). 
36 Gore, 517 U.S. at 585-86. 
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Campbell. 37 In that case, it reversed the Supreme Court of Utah, 
which had reinstated a 145 million dollar punitive damage award 
against State Farm for bad faith and fraud, when compensatory 
damages had been set at one million dollars.38 Applying the Gore 
guideposts, the United States Supreme Court held that an award at or 
near the compensatory damage amount would have been justified, and 
therefore an award of 145 times that amount was clearly excessive.39 
The Court stated that in most cases, punitive damages should not 
exceed four times the amount of compensatory damages, and that very 
few awards exceeding a single-digit rati040 would satisfy due 
process.41 The Court noted that when "a particularly egregious act 
has resulted in only a small amount of damages," a higher award ratio 
might occasionally be acceptable.42 But the Court went on to state that 
the "converse is also true.,,43 In cases similar to State Farm, where 
compensatory damages were quite substantial, "a lesser ratio, perhaps 
only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of 
the due process guarantee. ,,44 
Although State Farm was primarily addressed to the limits to be 
applied by trial and appellate courts when reviewing jury verdicts for 
excessiveness, the Court also revisited, for the first time since Haslip, 
the requirements for jury instructions concerning punitive damages.45 
The Court specifically held that it was unconstitutional to use evidence 
of out-of-state-conduct that was lawful in the jurisdiction in which it 
occurred to punish the defendant, and that the jury in such cases must 
be so instructed.46 The Court, in dicta, also criticized "vague 
instructions,,,47 as giving the jury too much discretion in the awarding 
of damages. 
The Court's most recent decision concerning punitive damage 
awards involved appropriate jury instructions when the jury has been 
presented with evidence of harm done by the defendant to persons 
other than the plaintiff.48 The Court held that the jury could hear such 
37 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
38 ld. 
39 ld. at 429. 
40 ld. at 425 (i.e., greater than 9 to I). 
41 ld. 
42 ld. 
43 ld. 
44 ld. 
45 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
46 !d. at 422. 
47 !d. at 418. 
48 Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007). 
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evidence and use it to detennine the extent of reprehensibility of the 
defendant's conduct.49 The Court went on to hold, however, that in 
such cases, the trial judge must instruct the jury that the defendant may 
not be punished "on account of hanns it is alleged to have visited on 
nonparties. ,,50 
III. THE MARYLAND LAW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
As do other states, Maryland allows, but does not compel, the jury 
to award punitive damages "to punish the defendant for egregiously 
bad conduct toward the plaintiff, [and] also to deter the defendant and 
others contemplating similar behavior.,,51 As with federal law, 
Maryland law has also undergone some changes, also starting in the 
early 1990's. In reviewing punitive damage awards for excessiveness, 
Maryland trial and appellate courts have, of course been required to 
comply with recent Supreme Court cases in this area. In addition, 
however, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has heightened the state-
of-mind requirement and burden of proof necessary to award punitive 
damages in the first place.52 These are more stringent requirements of 
Maryland law not required by the United States Constitution. 
In 1992, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed a line of cases 
which had allowed punitive damages in cases of implied malice,53 and 
held in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia,54 that in all cases, plaintiff 
must prove "actual malice" on the part of the defendant. The 
requirement of actual malice has different meanings with different 
torts. For example, the Court of Appeals of Maryland announced in 
Zenobia that in products liability cases, defendant must have "actual 
knowledge" of a defect and then must show conscious or deliberate 
disregard of the foreseeable harm resulting from the defect.55 It does 
not suffice for defendant to have "constructive knowledge," i.e. 
"should have known" of the defects. 56 
We ... emphatically state that negligence alone, no matter how 
gross, wanton, or outrageous, will not satisfy this standard. 
49 !d. at 1064-65. 
50 ld. at 1064. 
51 Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 350 Md. 4, 22, 710 A.2d 267, 276 (1998) (quoting Owens-
Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett, 343 Md. 500,537-38,682 A.2d 1143, 1161 (1996); 
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420,454,601 A.2d 633,650 (1992)). 
52 See irifra notes 51-60 and accompanying text. . 
53 Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149,297 A.2d. 721 (1972). 
54 325 Md. 420, 560, 601 A.2d 633, 652 (1992). 
55 See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. 
56 ld. at 462-63,601 A.2d at 653-54. 
34 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 38 
Instead the test requires a bad faith decision by the defendant 
to market a product, knowing of the defect and danger, in 
conscious or deliberate disregard of the threat to the safety of 
the consumer. 57 
The Zenobia court went on to hold that the plaintiff must establish 
malice on the part of defendant by "clear and convincing evidence.,,58 
Several years later, in Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 59 the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland made clear that the requirement of actual malice 
applied to all torts, including the intentional torts of false 
imprisonment or malicious prosecution. In the above case, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland reversed the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland, which had distinguished Zenobia as applying only to non-
intentional torts60 and had erroneously held that punitive damages 
could be awarded in a malicious prosecution or false imprisonment 
case "where malice may be implied from wantonness or from lack of 
probable cause.,,61 
In later cases the Court of Appeals of Maryland has gone on to hold 
that the "clear and convincing" standard applies to the burden of 
production as well as persuasion.62 This means that a trial court, in 
evaluating whether a case should go to the jury, must find that the 
plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could 
find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had acted 
maliciously.63 In addition, Maryland courts have consistently held 
that juries may not award any punitive damages unless they have 
awarded compensatory damages in at least a nominal amount. 64 
Both before and after the Supreme Court's recent decisions 
applying due process standards to the procedures and size of punitive 
damage awards, Maryland courts (both trial and appellate) have 
exercised the power to reduce the amounts of awards which, under 
state law, were found to be "excessive.,,65 Before the Supreme Court's 
57 ld. at 463,601 A.2d at 654. 
58 ld. at 465-69,601 A.2d at 655-57. 
59 339 Md. 701,664 A.2d 916 (1995). 
60 101 Md. App. 535, 549, 647 A.2d 1218, 1225 (1994). 
61 Jd. at 549,647 A.2d at 1225. 
62 Darcars Motors of Silver Spring, Inc. v. Borzym, 379 Md. 249, 267-68, 841 A.2d 828, 
839 (2004). 
63 ld. at 268-69,841 A.2d at 839-40. 
64 Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden, 330 Md. 632, 661-62, 625 A.2d 959,973-74 (1993). 
65 Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 350 Md. 4, 25, 710 A.2d 267, 277 (1998) (citing Ellerin v. 
Fairfax Sav., F.S.B., 337 Md. 216,242,652 A.2d 1117, 1130 (1995)). The Court in 
Bowden announced nine factors (some of them previously established and some new, 
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recent line of decisions, Maryland·· courts had not recognized a 
necessary relationship between the amount of an award of 
compensatory damages and the amount of the award for punitive 
damages,66 and had, in at least a few cases, allowed punitive damage 
awards many times larger than the compensatory awards.67 In the 
1990's, however, the Maryland courts, pursuant to Supreme Court 
mandate, began using Supreme Court guidelines as to the relationship 
between compensatory and punitive damages. In Alexander & 
Alexander, Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander and Associates, Inc.,68 the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland vacated a punitive damage award fifty 
times larger than the compensatory award, based upon the Supreme 
Court's dicta in Haslip that punitive damages of four times the 
compensatory damage award came close to the constitutional line.69 
In addition, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has developed a set of 
nine, non-exclusive factors to be used by trial and appellate courts 
when reviewing punitive damage awards for excessiveness.7o While 
these factors are somewhat different than the factors listed by the 
Supreme Court in Gore, they do include the Gore factors. In addition, 
the Maryland factors are actually more extensive than the Gore factors 
and should satisfy the Supreme Court's requirements. 71 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
some of them required by Supreme Court holdings and some of them independent 
requirements of Maryland law), by which courts should review punitive damage awards 
for excessiveness. 350 Md. at 27-41,710 A.2d at 278-85. 
Thc Court of Appeals noted in 1998 that it had earlier indicated that whether "'a punitive 
damages award [should] bear some relationship to the compensatory damages' was an 
open issue for 'exploration ... another day. ", Jd. at 38, 710 A2d at 283-84 (citing 
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 472 n.28, 601 A2d 633, 658 n.28 (1992». 
See Franklin Square Hosp. v. Laubach, 318 Md. 615,569 A.2d 693 (1990) ($700,000); 
Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Smith, 79 Md. App. 591, 558 A.2d 768 (1989) ($7,500,000); 
Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 69 Md. App. 124,516 A2d 990 (1986) ($910,000). 
88 Md. App. 672, 596 A.2d 687 (1991). 
Id. at 720, 596 A2d at 711, rev'd on other grounds, 336 Md. 635,650 A.2d 260 (1994). 
See Bowden, 350 Md. 4,710 A.2d 267. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland purposely made the Maryland standards at least as 
stringent and encompassing as the constitutional requirements in order to adhere to the 
principle "that a court should decide constitutional issues only when necessary." Jd. at 
26, 710 A2d at 278. "Consequently, the legal principles discussed below, applicable to 
judicial review of punitive damages awards for excessiveness, are set forth as principles 
of Maryland common law. Although some of these principles may be the same as 
requirements imposed by other courts as a matter of constitutional law, we have no 
reason at this time to consider minimum constitutional requirements in this area." Id. at 
26-27,710 A2d at 278. 
36 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 38 
IV. THE MARYLAND CIVIL PATTERN JURy INSTRUCTIONS 
The first edition of the Maryland Civil Pattern Jury Instructions was 
drafted in 1977 by a committee of the Maryland State Bar 
Association.72 They are currently in their fourth edition, published in 
2002, and are supplemented annually.73 The pattern jury instructions 
"are not mandatory on the court," an.d "are subject to objection and 
reversal.,,74 They are, however, influential upon and used by many 
Maryland judges, and the instructions on punitive damages have 
recently gotten implicit approval in a Court of Appeals of Maryland 
decision.75 
The general instructions for punitive damages in the Maryland 
Civil Pattern Jury Instructions are contained in chapter ten, section 
thirteen ("10:13"), which provides: 
If you find for the plaintiff and award damages to compensate 
for the injuries (losses) suffered, you may go on to consider 
whether to make an award for punitive damages. An award 
of punitive damages must be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
An award for punitive damages should be: 
(1) In an amount that will deter the defendant and others from 
similar conduct. 
(2) Proportionate to the wrongfulness of the defendant's 
conduct and the defendant's ability to pay. 
(3) But not designed to bankrupt or financially destroy a 
defendant. 76 
In addition, sections 10: 14 - 10: 19 provide instructions for what 
constitutes "actual malice," for various kinds of torts. 77 A judge's 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
See MD. CIV. PATIERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS ix. (4th ed. 2002 & Supp. 2007) (noting that 
the jury instructions are actually drafted by the Civil Subcommittee of the Standing 
Committee on the Maryland Pattern Jury Instructions of the Maryland State Bar 
Association, Inc.). 
ld. 
MD. CIV. PATIERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS xiii-xiv (4th ed. 2002 & Supp. 2007) (where the 
"General Explanatory Notes on Use" indicate that "[t]hese instructions are not mandatory 
on the Court"). 
In Darcars Motors of Silver Spring, Inc. v. Borzym, 379 Md. 249, 841 A.2d 828 (2004), 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland affinned an award of punitive damages after noting 
that the jury had been instructed "according to Section 10:[13] of the Maryland Pattern 
Jury Instruction." ld. at 277,841 A.2d at 845. 
MD. Civ. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 10:13 (4th ed. 2002 & Supp. 2007). 
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instruction in a case in which a plaintiff had requested pumtIve 
damages would normally consist of the general instructions (10: 13) 
and one of the more specific instructions as to state of mind, 
depending on the kind of tort. 78 
V. WHAT CHANGES ARE NEEDED? 
There are, however, some problems with the pattern instructions. 
which should be addressed: some because they do not accurately or 
adequately explain current Maryland law; some because the Maryland 
substantive law itself needs clarifying; and some because they might 
lead to punitive damages being awarded in a manner that would 
violate the United States Constitution. 
A. Lack of a Clear Standardfor Deciding Whether to Award Punitive 
Damages 
The instructions describe the two basic requirements under 
Maryland law for all awards of punitive damages (an award of 
compensatory damage and actual malice) and also give directions to 
the jury on how to set the amount of the damages. 79 They also 
indicate that the award of punitive damages is discretionary by stating: 
" ... you may go on to consider whether to make an award of punitive 
damages.,,8o 
What is missing, however, is a clear statement of how the jury 
should exercise that discretion, i.e. what is the standard (beyond the 
minimum requirements of a compensatory damage award and a 
finding of actual malice )81 for making such an award. In other words, 
there needs to be an instruction that will help the jury decide whether 
or not to award punitive damages when the basic prerequisites have 
been met. That statement should be something like the following: 
You may, but are not required to make an award of punitive 
damages if you believe tha~ defendant's conduct was so 
reprehensible as to deserve punishment or if you believe 
77 MD. CIv. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS §§ 10:14 (Misrepresentation/Fraud), 10:15 
(Product Liability), 10: 18 (Malicious Prosecution), 10: 19 (Operation of a Motor Vehicle) 
(4th ed. 2002 & Supp. 2007). 
78 See generally id (noting that there are specific jury instructions for punitive damage 
awards as to particular torts). 
79 MD. CIv. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 10:13 (4th ed. 2002 & Supp. 2007). 
80 Id. § 10: 13. 
81 See generally id. (providing general guidance for awarding punitive damages). 
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punishment is w~rranted to deter defendant or others from 
similar conduct. 
Now, it could be argued that this statement is superfluous because it 
is very similar to the instructions for determining the amount of the 
punitive damage award, but there is a difference. Under the current 
instruction, juries are told that the amount of the award must be 
proportionate to the defendant's wrongfulness82 and in an amount that 
will provide deterrence.83 However, the jury is not told that even if 
they believe that the defendant's conduct was "wrongful" to a certain 
degree and that an additional award would deter such future conduct, 
they may still decide not to award any damages at all unless they 
believe that the defendant's conduct was so wrongful (or more 
accurately heinous or reprehensible)84 as to deserve punishment.85 
It could also be argued that this statement is not necessary because 
one of the more particularized instructions of sections 10: 13-19 
(depending on the kind of tort) that will accompany the general 
instructions to the effect that the defendant's actions must be based on 
malice or intent, and not just negligence, will suffice to provide this 
guidance. For example, in motor vehicle cases, the jury is told that the 
defendant's conduct "must be characterized by evil motive, intent to 
injure, or ill will.,,86 But whether the defendant acted with such a 
malicious state of mind is only a minimum requirement to award 
punitive damages, not the standard. 87 In some cases, the jury could 
find that the defendant's conduct was characterized by evil motive or 
ill will, but still not believe that it was so reprehensible that it deserved 
an award of damages in addition to those necessary to compensate the 
plaintiff. 
B. Clarification and Limitation of the "Clear and Convincing 
Evidence" Requirement 
The part of the general instructions which states: "An award of 
punitive damages must be proven by clear and convincing evidence,,88 
82 !d. § 10: 13(2). 
83 ld. § 10: 13(1). 
84 See supra section Ill. 
85 "[A] plaintiff has no right or entitlement to punitive damages under Maryland law. 
'[T]he trier of fact has discretion to deny punitive damages even where the record 
otherwise would support their award.'" Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 350 Md. 4, 25, 710 A.2d 
267,277 (quoting Adams v. Coates, 331 Md. I, 15,626 A.2d 36, 43 (1993)). 
86 MD. Crv. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 10: 19 (4th ed. 2002 & Supp. 2007). 
87 Seeid. § 10:13. 
88 ld. § 10: 13. 
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was added in response to the 1992 Court of Appeals of Maryland 
decision in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia.89 It is true that the court 
made such a statement at one point in the opinion, where it stated: "a 
plaintiff must establish by clear and convincing evidence the basis for 
an award of punitive damages.,,9o It is clear, however, given the 
context of the court's statement and the issue it was deciding, that it 
intended the clear and convincing standard to apply only to the finding 
of actual malice.91 The "clear and convincing" standard should not 
apply to the other aspects of the plaintiffs burden: i.e., to prove that 
the defendant's conduct was reprehensible enough to deserve 
punishment and to require deterrence. Yet the placement of the "clear 
and convincing" language in the general instructions, instead of with 
the instructions on state of mind, and the fact that it refers to the 
burden of proof for "an award of punitive damages" rather than "a 
finding of actual malice,,92 could confuse the jury into thinking that the 
plaintiff also had this heightened burden as to reprehensibility and 
need for deterrence. 
It must be remembered that the main issue and holding in the 
Zenobia case was not the burden of proof, but rather: "what should be 
the correct standard under Maryland law for the allowance of punitive 
damages in negligence and products liability cases, i.e. [sic], gross 
negligence, actual malice, or some other standard.,,93 The court 
devoted the great majority of the portion of the opinion directed to 
punitive damages to this issue.94 In the end, the court reversed the 
1972 case of Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe, CO.,95 which had allowed 
punitive damages to be based on implied, rather than actual malice. It 
was only after determining that an award of punitive damages in a 
products liability case required a finding of actual rna-lice that the 
Zenobia court went on to discuss the secondary issue of the proper 
standard of proof required for this finding. 96 
At the beginning of the section dealing with burden of proof, the 
court clearly stated the issue, "[t]he defendant Owens-Illinois and 
some amici have argued that, in order for a jury to consider a punitive 
damages award, a plaintiff should be required to establish by clear and 
89 325 Md. 420, 469, 601 A.2d 633, 657 (1992). 
90 Jd. at 469,601 A.2d at 657. 
91 See id. at 469, 601 A.2d at 657. 
92 MD. CIv. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 10: 13 (4th ed. 2002 & Supp. 2007). 
93 Zenobia, 325 Md. at 450,601 A.2d at 647. 
94 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
95 267 Md. 149,297 A.2d 721 (1972). 
96 Zenobia, 325 Md. at 465,601 A.2d at 655. 
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convincing evidence that the defendant's conduct was characterized by 
actual malice.,,97 
The entire section of the opinion devoted to the question of 
standard of proof discusses the issue in terms of how it affects the 
state-of-mind requirement.98 It is quite likely, therefore, that the 
court's broader statement that the .plaintiff must establish "the basis for 
an award of punitive damages,,9 by clear and convincing evidence 
referred only to the actual malice portion of their decision. 
Not only is this narrower reading of the holding more consistent 
with the court's intent, it is also the one that makes the most sense. It 
does make sense to discuss the burden of proof required on what are 
clearly issues of fact, such as whether the defendant showed the 
required state of mind. It does not really make any sense to discuss it 
when examining issues of judgment, such as whether a defendant's 
conduct is so reprehensible as to require punishment, or what is the 
appropriate amount necessary to punish the defendant and to deter the 
defendant and others from similar conduct. 
The United States Supreme Court recognized this distinction in the 
case of Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 100 in 
which it held that states must provide de novo appellate review of 
punitive damage awards. The Court recognized that while de novo 
review of compensatory damages might violate the Seventh 
Amendment, such review of punitive damage awards does not, 
because they do not constitute "findings of fact."]0] The Court stated: 
"A jury's assessment of the extent ofa plaintiffs injury is essentially a 
factual determination, whereas its imposition of punitive damages is 
an expression of its moral condernnation.,,]02 
For these reasons, both the placement and wording of the 
instructions on clear and convincing evidence should be changed. The 
"clear and convincing" language should be removed from the general 
instruction in section 10: 13, ]03 and moved to the various instructions 
for each tort on the particular definition of "actual malice" for that tort. 
For example, the instruction for cases of injuries by operation of a 
motor vehicle (10:19) now reads: "For punitive damages to be 
97 Jd. at 465,601 A.2d at 655. 
98 Jd. at 469,601 A.2d at 657. 
99 Id. at 469,601 A.2d at 657. 
100 532 U.S. 424 (2001). 
101 Id. at 437. 
102 Id. at 432. 
103 MD. CIV. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 10: 13 (4th ed. 2002 & Supp. 2007). 
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recoverable as a result of injuries suffered from the wrongful operation 
of a motor vehicle, the wrongful conduct must be characterized by evil 
motive, intent to injure, or ill Will."I04 That should be followed by the 
sentence: "Such evil motive, intent to injure, or ill will must be 
proved by clear and convincing evidence." 
C. Defendant's Net Worth and Ability to Pay 
The general instructions contain two references to the financial 
condition of the defendant and how that should affect the amount of a 
damage award. They state that the award should be proportionate not 
only to the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct but also to "the 
defendant's ability to pay.,,105 In addition, the award should "not [be] 
designed to bankrupt or financially destroy a defendant."lo6 
It is clear that the latter of these two instructions is designed purely 
as a limitation on the amount of damages in some cases. The former 
instruction that the award be proportionate to the defendant's ability to 
pay, however, seems designed to allow the jury both to increase or 
decrease the amount of the award for the same conduct, based on the 
ability to pay (or at least might make the jury think so). There are 
several problems with the current instructions, some relating to the 
substance of the instructions (which may run afoul of recent Supreme 
Court pronouncements) and some relating to the timing of when the 
instructions are given. 
As to the timing, the current instructions seem to be designed to be 
given to the jury at the conclusion of the evidence, and to instruct the 
jury both as to whether to award punitive damages and in what 
amount. The biggest problem with this approach, however, is that 
Maryland law, by statute, prohibits admission of any evidence of the 
defendant's financial means, "until there has been a finding of liability 
and that punitive damages are supportable under the facts."I07 
Therefore, in cases where the jury is deciding both the appropriateness 
of any award and the amount at the same time, they must necessarily 
be doing so without having heard any evidence about the defendant's 
ability to pay. 
At the very least, it must be confusing to a jury to be instructed to 
take the defendant's ability to pay into consideration while being given 
104 Id. § 10: 19. 
105 !d. § 10:13(2). 
106 ld. § 10:13(3). 
107 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-9\3(a) (LexisNexis 2006). 
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no factual predicate upon which to make this determination. It may 
also be unfair to either the plaintiff, if the jury wrongly assumes that a 
high award might bankrupt a defendant and thereby limits the award, 
or unfair to the defendant, if they wrongly assume that a defendant is 
very wealthy and therefore proportionately increase the amount of the 
award. 
The Maryland courts have developed a bifurcated procedure to deal 
with this problem. l08 When using such a procedure, the court instructs 
the jury to determine whether or not there should be an award of 
punitive damages at the same time that they are deciding liability and 
compensatory damages. 109 If and only if they return with a finding that 
punitive damages are called for, are the parties allowed to present 
evidence of defendant's financial condition and the jury is instructed 
on how to set the amount of the award, which they do in a second 
deliberation. I 10 For some reason, however, the Maryland appellate 
courts, while recognizing the benefits of such an approach, have made 
it discretionary with the trial judge as to whether to use it or not. III If 
the instructions on the defendant's ability to pay are to remain at all,1l2 
then this procedure should be mandatory. Since the courts have 
recognized that there is no real impediment or downside to the 
bifurcated approach,113 there is absolutely no reason for the jury ever 
to be told to consider the defendant's financial condition unless the 
parties have had the opportunity to present evidence on this issue. 
108 "[T]he trial court will instruct the jury on the compensatory claims and on the 
defendant's potential liability for punitive damages. Then, once the jury has made a 
finding of liability ... for punitive damages, the trial court will further instruct the jury 
concerning the calculation of a punitive damages award." Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. 
Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 473 n.29, 601 A.2d 633, 659 n.29 (1992). 
109 Id. at 473 n.29, 601 A.2d at 659 n.29. 
110 Id. at 473 n.29, 601 A.2d at 659 n.29. 
III "We stated plainly in Zenobia, however, that the bifurcated procedure is not mandatory." 
Darcars Motors of Silver Spring v. Borzym, 397 Md. 249, 274, 841 A.2d 843 (2004) 
(citing Zenobia, 325 Md. at 465, 473, 601 A.2d at 659). The Zenobia court was 
apparently worried about the presentation of duplicative evidence at the compensatory 
and punitive damage stages of the trial. The court in Darcars Motors, however, seemed 
to dispel that problem. See infra note 113. 
112 See infra note 124 and accompanying text. 
113 The court in Darcars Motors, while recognizing that the bifurcated procedure is not 
required, did note that the "general practice has been to withhold evidence of a 
defendant's ability to pay punitive damages 'until and unless the jury awards 
compensatory damages and decides to award punitive damages.'" 379 Md. at 274, 841 
A.2d at 843 (quoting Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 101 Md. App. 535, 551, 647 A.2d 
1218, 1226 (1994)). The court went on to say "[t]here is but one jury and one trial, 
although the presentation of financial evidence is delayed until the appropriate time. 
Thus, the trial truly is not divided into two parts, and witnesses need not be recalled." Id. 
at 274-75,841 A.2d at 843. 
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In addition to the problem of the timing of the instructions on 
financial condition, there is also a problem with the substance of the 
instructions. To the extent that they instruct a jury that punitive 
damages should be proportionate with the defendant's ability to pay, 
they are in violation of the Due Process Clause under current Supreme 
Court doctrine.1I4 Further, the instruction limiting the amount of 
damages so as not to financially destroy a defendant, although 
designed to protect a defendant from excessive awards, may also 
violate a defendant's due process rights if given without his or her 
request or consent. 
The United States Supreme Court first expressed concern about 
providing juries with evidence of the defendant's ability to pay in 
Haslip.115 In holding that the award in that case did not violate the 
Constitution, the Court first noted that: "Any evidence of Pacific 
Mutual's wealth was excluded from the trial in accord with Alabama 
law.,,116 While not commenting on whether a jury could receive such 
evidence, it did require that "the factfinder must be guided by more 
than the defendant's net worth." I I? The Court was concerned that a 
plaintiff "not enjoy a windfall because they have the good fortune to 
have a defendant with a deep pocket." I 18 
In BMW v. Gore, in which the Court laid out its three guideposts 
for determining whether the award of punitive damages was excessive, 
none of those guideposts had anything to do with the defendant's net 
worth or ability to pay.119 In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,120 the Court 
noted that "presentation of evidence of a defendant's net worth creates 
the potential that juries will use their verdicts to express biases against 
big businesses, particularly those without strong local presences.,,121 
While the Court has not (at least yet) held that evidence of a 
defendant's wealth must be withheld from the jury, such evidence 
must be used very carefully. It is likely that the Court would 
disapprove any instruction which would indicate that the amount of 
114 See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text. 
115 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
116 !d. at 19. 
II? !d. at 22. 
lIS Id. 
119 517 U.S. 559, 560(1996). 
120 512 U.S. 415 (1994). 
121 Id. at 432. 
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the award could be used to increase, as opposed to limit, defendant's 
liability. 122 
The current Maryland pattern instructions seem to do just that by 
instructing the jury to make the award proportionate to the defendant's 
ability to pay.123 This language should be removed. The further 
instruction that the award not be "designed to bankrupt or financially 
destroy a defendant" is constitutional and can remain. 124 It should, 
however, only be given at the request of the defendant. In fact, if 
evidence of a defendant's wealth can be used only to limit and not 
increase the amount of damages, then such evidence should only be 
introduced, at least in the first instance, by the defendant. Current 
Maryland law allows, but does not require, a plaintiff to present 
evidence of a defendant's financial situation.125 That should be 
changed so that a plaintiff may only introduce such evidence after the 
defendant has opened the door on this issue by doing so. 
In practice, the combination of the two new rules being proposed 
(no evidence of and instruction about defendant's financial condition 
unless requested by defendant, and then only in the second part of a 
bifurcated deliberation process) would work as follows: 
1. If the defendant decides, before the case goes to the 
jury, that it wants to exclude such evidence (as would, 
normally, a very large corporation) then no such evidence 
is allowed, and the case goes to the jury on liability, 
compensatory damages and punitive damages at one time, 
with no instruction given as to the defendant's financial 
condition. 
2. If the defendant decides that it will (or may) want such 
an instruction, then the jury first determines liability, the 
amount of compensatory damages and whether punitive 
damages are called for, without any instruction on how to 
set the amount of such damages. If the jury finds that 
punitive damages are called for, the parties may then 
present evidence of the defendant's financial condition and 
will be instructed on the factors to consider in setting the 
amount of the award, including the fact that the jury 
122 Anthony J. Franze & Sheila B. Scheuerman, Instructing Juries on Punitive Damages: 
Due Process Revisited After State Farm, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 423, 520 (2004). 
123 . See MD. elY. PA ITERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 10: 13(2) (4th ed. 2002 & Supp. 2007). 
124 MD. CIY. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 10:13(3) (4th ed. 2002 & Supp. 2007). 
125 See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text. 
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should not set them at an amount that would "bankrupt or 
financially destroy a defendant.,,126 
D. Additional Instructions to Help the Jury Set the Amount of 
Damages 
45 
The current Maryland Pattern Jury Instructions tell the jury, in 
setting the amount of the damages, to do so "[i]n an amount that will 
deter the defendant and others from similar conduct," and that is 
IT 
"[p]roportionate to the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct." I 
These are two of the most important factors for the jury to consider. 
They satisfy the standards established for d:ury instructions by the 
Supreme Court in 1989 in the Haslip case. I 8 More recent Supreme 
Court opinions, however, may require additional guidance to the jury 
in setting the amount of the awards. 
1. No Punishment for Wrongful Conduct Toward Non parties 
There is one additional instruction that is clearly needed, at least in 
certain cases, relating to the jury's use of evidence of the defendant's 
wrongful conduct towards persons other than the plaintiff. In Philip 
Morris USA v. Williams, the Court held that evidence of defendant's 
conduct leading to harm to others could be admissible to help prove 
the reprehensibility of that conduct. 129 It stated: "Evidence of actual 
harm to nonparties can help to show that the conduct that harmed the 
plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public, and 
so was particularly reprehensible.,,13o The Court went on to say, 
however, that "a jury may not go further than this and use a punitive 
damages verdict to punish a defendant directly on account of harms it 
is alleged to have visited on nonparties.,,131 
Therefore, on all occasions when a court admits evidence of harm 
suffered by others due to defendant's misconduct, it must include an 
instruction to the effect that the jury may not "punish the defendant for 
126 Jd. § 10: 13(3) (noting the current Maryland jury instruction). 
127 MD. CIv. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 10: 13(1)-(2) (4th ed. 2002 & Supp. 2007). 
128 "Under the traditional common-law approach, the amount of the punitive award is 
initially determined by ajury instructed to consider the gravity of the wrong and the need 
to deter similar wrongful conduct." Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. I, 15 
(1991). 
129 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007). 
130 ld. at 1064. 
131 ld. 
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the impact of its alle~ed misconduct on other persons [than the 
plaintiff or plaintiffs].,,1 2 
2. Factors to be Considered by the Jury in Setting the Amount 
of Punitive Damages 
Perhaps the hardest question to decide is what, if any, additional 
guidance the jury should be given about the three guideposts that the 
Court requires trial and appellate judges to use in determining whether 
an award is excessive. These are: 
1. The degree of reprehensibility of defendant's conduct, 
2. the relationship between the harm to the plaintiff (as 
measured in most cases by amount of compensatory 
damages) and the amount of punitive damages, and 
3. the relationship between the damages award and civil 
penalties authorized or imposed in other cases. 133 
On the first guidepost, the Court has given additional guidance to 
appellate courts as to the factors to consider when evaluating the 
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct. 134 On the second 
guidepost, the Court has announced the kind of ratios between 
compensatory and punitive damages that it would find reasonable, at 
least in most instances. 135 The Maryland Pattern Jury Instructions tell 
the jury to consider the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct (first 
guidepost), but do not list additional factors to be considered when 
making this determination. The instructions do not contain any 
mention of the second guidepost (the relationship between harm to the 
plaintiff and the amount of damages), or to the third (comparing the 
award of damages to other civil remedies). It should be examined 
whether the instructions should provide guidance on the second and 
third guideposts. 
On the one hand, just because a factor is listed by the Court to be 
used by judges in reviewing the reasonableness of a jury award does 
not mean that the jury should be informed of it in most cases. 136 On 
132 ld. 
133 BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). 
134 See infra note 140 and accompanying text. 
135 See infra notes 146-148 and accompanying text. 
136 "In addition, simply because a principle should be considered by the court in reviewing a 
punitive damages award for excessiveness does not mean that the same principle should 
give rise to an appropriate issue for a ... jury instruction." Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 350 
Md. 4, 41, 710 A.2d 267,285 (1998); accord Franze & Scheuerman, supra note 122, at 
522-23. 
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the other hand, it makes sense, to the extent possible, to have the jury 
applying the same standards in making an award that the courts will 
apply in reviewing them, since this will result in fewer verdicts being 
reduced by trial or appellate judges. 137 
Of the three guideposts, the one looking to comparable civil 
penalties should not be communicated to the jury. It would make no 
sense to instruct the jury on comparing its award to other civil 
penalties which the courts could impose. This is a judicial decision, 
which the jury has neither the knowledge nor expertise to make.138 No 
courts have expressed an interest in communicating this factor to the 
JUry. 
As to the guidepost on the wrongfulness of the defendant's 
conduct, the jury is already instructed to consider this.139 The question 
with that guidepost is whether the instructions should include more 
detailed factors for the jury to consider in determining the 
wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct. As to the guidepost 
requiring a reasonable relationship between compensatory and 
punitive damages, the issue is first, whether this should even be 
mentioned to the jury, and if so, should they be given any additional 
numerical information about this relationship. 
a. Reprehensibility Factors 
The Supreme Court has listed five factors that courts should 
consider in determining the reprehensibility of the defendant's 
conduct. They are whether: 
1. the harm was physical as opposed to economic; 
2. the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or 
reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; 
3. the target of the conduct had financial 
vulnerabili ty; 
4. the conduct involved repeated actions or was an 
isolated instance; and 
137 Relying on post-verdict review as a check on arbitrary awards is both strikingly 
inefficient and undermines the jury's role in the process. Franze & Scheuerman, supra 
note 122, at 524. 
138 "Specifically, the jury should not be informed about the availability of comparable 
penalties ... these factors are better suited for judicial review, rather than consideration by 
the jury." Franze & Scheuerman, supra note 117, at 523. 
139 See infra note 140 and accompanying text; see also MD. CIV. PATTERN JURy INSTRUCTIONS 
§ 10: 13(2) (4th ed. 2002 & Supp. 2007). 
48 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 38 
5. the harm was the result of intentional malice, 
trickery, or deceit, or mere accident. 14o 
Courts in Maryland do not need to be concerned with the fifth 
factor, since only behavior evincing intentional malice qualifies for 
punitive damages in this state. 141 The other four factors, at least in 
some cases, are questions that a reasonable jury might, or even should, 
consider in making a punitive damage award. Since the Supreme 
Court has criticized the use of "vague" jury instructions 142 in state 
courts, the Maryland Pattern Jury Instructions should suggest that the 
judge instruct the jury on whichever of these factors may be relevant 
to the case. 
This may not, however, be either necessary or wise. Taking the 
third factor (vulnerability of plaintiff) as an example, if the case 
involved a large corporation taking advantage of the vulnerability of a 
poor, single parent, then one would expect the plaintiff's attorney to 
argue this factor to the jury when arguing reprehensibility. By the 
same token, if the case involved harm done by one large business to 
another, one would expect the defendant's attorney to use this factor in 
their argument so the jury will not be left without any guidance on 
what might constitute reprehensible conduct. Since this (reward) is 
not really a legal standard, but merely a common-sense factor, it is not 
necessary for the judge to instruct the jury that it is more reprehensible 
to take advantage of the weak than of the strong. Even without such 
an instruction, the lawyers will be able to argue, and juries will be able 
to consider, this in their determination of reprehensibility. 
In addition, there is a disadvantage to the judge listing one or more 
of these factors. On the one hand, the jury might feel that they are not 
entitled to consider any other factors not listed by the court (which 
they clearly may, if relevant), and on the other, they may take the 
judge's listing of a particular factor as evidence that he or she believed 
the factor should play an important role in their decision. Therefore, at 
this time, unless the Supreme Court, in a future case, requires juries to 
be instructed on these factors, judges can continue to instruct the jury 
merely to consider the extent of the defendant's wrongfulness or 
reprehensibility. 
This leads to the related issue of whether the instructions should 
continue to use "wrongfulness" as the standard, as opposed to 
140 State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003). 
141 See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text. 
142 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418. 
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"reprehensibility," which is the term more often used by the Supreme 
Court. While "wrongfulness" might be a somewhat simpler word 
understood by more jurors,143 it probably does not clearly convey the 
kind of conduct that warrants punitive damages. All tortious behavior 
is, to a certain extent, wrongful in some way (even if not intentional). 
Punitive damages, however, are reserved for particularly wrongful, i.e. 
"reprehensible" conduct, and this is probably the better term to use in 
the jury instructions. 
b. Proportionality of Amount of Punitive Damages to Amount 
of Harm to Plaintiff 
The last issue that must be discussed is whether, and in how much 
detail, the jury should be informed that the amount of punitive 
damages must be proportionate to the harm done to the plaintiff 
(which in most, but not all, cases is defined by the Supreme Court as 
the amount of compensatory damages).I44 With each opinion, the 
Supreme Court has become clearer that this is an important factor in 
appellate review, and has come closer to establishing a mathematical 
formula for making this determination in most cases. 145 
The Court has opined that (1) "few awards exceeding a single-digit 
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages,,146 will satisfy due 
process; (2) that in most cases, "an award of more than four times the 
amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of 
constitutional impropriety,,,147 and (3) that in some cases involving 
very large compensatory damages, a ratio of no more than one-to-one 
would be allowed. 148 
First of all, even if the jury is to be informed that the punitive 
damage award must be proportionate to the plaintiff's harm, they 
should not be informed of the presumptive ratios established by the 
Supreme Court. For one thing, these ratios are just that; presumptions, 
143 The Pattern Jury Instructions Committee has stated their bias for using simple language 
whenever possible. "Difficult legal concepts were replaced with simple language ... ". 
MD. CIV. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS xiii-xiv (4th ed. 2002 & Supp. 2007). This 
approach makes sense. However, "reprehensible," while a longer and somewhat less 
common word than "wrongful," is not a "difficult legal concept" and should be 
understood by most jurors. It is clearly more descriptive of the kind of conduct which 
deserves punitive damages. 
144 See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text. 
145 See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text. 
146 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,425 (2003). 
147 Id. at 425. 
148 Id. 
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which should apply in most, but not all, cases. The Court has noted 
that the ratios should not apply in cases in which the plaintiff s 
damages were small, but the potential for harm had been very great. 149 
More importantly, since the ratios function in some ways as a cap on 
damages, they should be treated like most other caps on damages, and 
that is, applied after the fact by the court if necessary, but not 
communicated to the jury. ISO It is not fair to the plaintiff to inform the 
jury that a damage award should not exceed a certain amount (or 
ratio), since they may be disinclined to make an award at or near the 
cap, even if the facts warrant it. Although not informing a jury of the 
presumptive ratios may result in somewhat more cases in which a 
jury's verdict needs to be reduced by the court, neither party is 
unfairly put in a worse situation than if the jury had been informed of 
the ratios in advance. lSI 
It probably does make sense, and may even be required by the 
Supreme Court cases, to inform the jury that there should be some 
relationship between harm (or potential harm) to the plaintiff and the 
amount of punitive damages. The instruction should refer to 
proportionality between the harm to the plaintiff and the amount of 
punitive damages, and not between the amount of compensatory 
damages and the amount of punitive damages. Instructing the jury that 
punitive damages must be proportionate to compensatory damages 
may lead them to believe wrongly that the punitive damages must not 
exceed the amount of compensatory damages. It also would not allow 
them to consider the potential harm to the plaintiff in appropriate 
cases. 
Therefore, while the Maryland Pattern Jury Instructions now 
instruct the jury that the punitive damage award should be 
149 "Nonetheless, because there are no rigid benchmarks that a punitive damages award may 
not surpass, ratios greater than those we have previously upheld may comport with due 
process where 'a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of 
economic damages"' ... [or] "a higher ratio might be necessary where 'the injury is hard to 
detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to 
determine.'" ld.; accord Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 350 Md. 4, 40, 710 A.2d 267, 285 
(1998). 
150 In other areas where there is a legislative damage cap (i.e. medical malpractice actions), 
the Maryland Pattern Jury Instructions do not contain a reference to the cap; see also 
Franze & Scheuerman, supra note 122, at 523 ("[T]he jury should not be informed 
about.. . statutory caps on punitive awards."). 
151 Unlike the granting of a remittitur of compensatory damages, a reduction in the amount 
of a punitive damage award will not sometimes result in a new trial. In the compensatory 
damage case, the court must offer the plaintiff the choice between a remittitur or a new 
trial. The court does not give the plaintiff such a choice when reducing a punitive award. 
See Bowden, 350 Md. at 43-63,710 A.2d at 286-97. 
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"proportionate to the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct," they 
should be amended to include proportionality to the harm (or potential 
harm) done to the plaintiff. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In line with the suggestions made throughout this article, the 
Maryland Civil Pattern Jury Instructions on punitive damages should 
be amended to read as follows: 
Section 10:13 (A) 
(To be given if Defendant waives the right to present evidence 
of its financial condition) 
"If you find for the plaintiff and award damages to 
compensate for the injuries (losses) suffered, you may, but are 
not required to, make an award of punitive damages. You may 
do so if you believe that the defendant's conduct was so 
reprehensible as to deserve punishment or if you believe 
punishment is warranted to deter defendant or others from 
similar conduct. 
An award for punitive damages should be 
1. Proportionate to the reprehensibility of 
defendant's conduct 
2. In an amount that will deter other 
defendants and others from similar conduct, and 
IS 
3. Proportionate to the harm (or potential 
harm) to the plaintiff." 
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Section 10:13 (B) 
Part 1 
Part 2 
(To be given if defendant requests the jury be instructed that 
the amount of the damage award not be designed to bankrupt 
or financially destroy it.) 
(Given when the case goes to the jury) 
"If you find for the plaintiff and award damages to 
compensate for the injuries (losses) suffered, you may, but are 
not required to, make an award of punitive damages. You may 
do so if you believe that the defendant's conduct was so 
reprehensible as to deserve punishment or if you believe 
punishment is warranted to deter defendant or others from 
similar conduct. 
Indicate whether you believe such an award is called for, but 
do not set a monetary value for this award." 
(Given if jury returns with a finding that punitive damages 
should be awarded, and given after the parties have had the 
opportunity to present evidence of defendant's financial 
condition.) 
"Y ou have returned a verdict that defendant's conduct 
deserves an award of punitive damages be made. You must 
now set the amount of damages based on all the evidence you 
have heard in this case. 
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An award for punitive damages should be 
1. Proportionate to the wrongfulness of 
defendant's conduct; 
2. in an amount that will deter defendant 
and others from similar conduct; 
3. proportionate to the harm (or potential 
harm) to the plaintiff;" 
4. but not designed to bankrupt or 
financially destroy the defendant." 
Sections 10:14 -10:18 
In each of these sections, after the statement of the appropriate 
state-of-mind required to award punitive damages in that case, 
an instruction should be inserted that: 
"Y ou must find that such malice (or knowledge, or evil 
motive, etc., depending on the wording of the section) was 
proved by clear and convincing evidence." 
